Communication Between U.S. Army Senior and Junior Officers as a Factor in Separation by Wetjen, Jeffrey H.
South Dakota State University 
Open PRAIRIE: Open Public Research Access Institutional 
Repository and Information Exchange 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations 
1978 
Communication Between U.S. Army Senior and Junior Officers as 
a Factor in Separation 
Jeffrey H. Wetjen 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openprairie.sdstate.edu/etd 
 Part of the Speech and Rhetorical Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Wetjen, Jeffrey H., "Communication Between U.S. Army Senior and Junior Officers as a Factor in 
Separation" (1978). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 5633. 
https://openprairie.sdstate.edu/etd/5633 
This Thesis - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by Open PRAIRIE: Open Public Research 
Access Institutional Repository and Information Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses 
and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Open PRAIRIE: Open Public Research Access Institutional 
Repository and Information Exchange. For more information, please contact michael.biondo@sdstate.edu. 
COMMUNICATION BETWEEN U.S. ARMY SENIOR AND JUNIOR 
OFFICERS AS A FACTOR IN SEPARATION 
BY 
JEFFREY H. WETJEN 
A thesis submitted 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
degree Master of Arts, Major in 
Speech, South Dakota 
State University 
1978 
SOUTH DAKOTA STATE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 
COJfJ}IUNICATION BETWEEN U.S. ARMY SENIOR AND JUNIOR 
OFFICERS AS A FACTOR IN SEPARATION 
This thesis is approved as a creditable and independent 
investigation by a candidate for the degree, Master of Arts, and 
is acceptable for meeting the thesis requirements for this degree. 
Acceptance of this thesis does not imply that the conclusions 





Sincere gratitude and thanks are extended to my advisor, 
Dr. Wayne E. Hoogestraat, for guidance, patience, and understanding 
during the course of this study. 
I also wish to extend my thanks to the personnel at West 
Point, Franklin Institute, and the U.S. Army Public Affairs Office 
for their help in the location of material vital to my study. 
Many individuals have been especially helpful to me during 
this study and I particularly wish to thank Ila Asmus. 
Finally, I wish to thank my wife, Jean, for her love, 
confidence, and occasional prodding throughout my graduate study. 
JHW 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter 
I. INTRODUCTION . 
Statement of Purpose . 
Origin of the Problem 
Procedures . 
Footnotes . . . .  
II. THE VIETNAM CONFLICT • . 
1957 Through 1965 . . .  
Pre United States Involvement . . . .  
The U.S. Becomes Involved 
1965 Through 1970 
The Buildup 
The Pullout 
War Attitudes at Horne 
11ili tary War Attitudes . 
Increased Junior Officer Separations 
Footnotes • . . • . . . .  


















OFFICERS . . . . . . . . . . 35 
Three Studies 
The Franklin Study . 
The West Point Study . 
The Ordnance Study . 
Method of Analysis . . . .  
The Franklin Institute of Research Stucy . 
The l.Jest Point Study . 
The Ordnance Study . .  
Summary 
Footnotes 
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary . . . . . . .  
A Summary of Events 
The Vietnam War 
















Summary of the Studies . 
The Franklin Study . . . . . 
The West Point Study . 
The Ordnance Study . .  
Conclusions . . . . . .  . 
Recommendations for Further Study 









LIST OF TABLES 
Table 
I. GOVERNMENT REPORTS ANNOUNCENENT REVIEW BY YEAR, 
CORPORATE TITLE, AND SUBJECT • • • • • • • • • • 
II. U. S. ARMY AND TOTAL U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN 
SOUTH VIETNAM • • • • • • • • • • • • 
III. PAST RETENTION EXPERIENCE 
IV. U. S. ARMY STRENGTH BY GRADE 







LIST OF CHARTS 
Chart 





Statement of Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to determine the communication 
relationship between U.S. Army Senior Officers and those Junior 
Officers who separated from the service voluntarily from 1966 
through 1970, as revealed in selected U.S. Army studies. 
Origin of the Problem 
During the period between 1966 and 1970, the U.S. Army 
experienced a high rate of Junior Officer separations. Department 
of the Army felt that problems within the military system may have 
been responsible for the high separation rate. During this period 
approximately 80 percent of the Junior Officers on active duty 
chose to leave active military service. Of these, approximately 
81.36 percent elected to leave after having completed more than 
two years, but less than four years, of active commissioned service, 
as determined by a review of U.S. Military Personnel records at 
St. Louis, Mo., in 1971. 1 
A variety of studies have been undertaken, primarily by 
the U.S. Army, attempting to determine the principal reasons for 
these voluntary separations. However, no specific studies were dis­
covered which have attempted to assess the communication relationship 
2 
between Junior and Senior Officers as a possible factor contributing 
to the decision to separate. 
An examination of the available studies dealing with reasons 
for Junior Officer separations show a substantial amount of data 
dealing with the communication relationship between Junior and 
Senior Officers. Specifically, these studies are the Franklin 
Institute of Research Study, "Career M.otivation of Army Personnel-­
Junior Officers' Duties;" U. S. Department of the Army, Office 
of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Study, "Why They Leave: 
Resignations from the USMA Class of 1966;" and the U.S. Army 
Ordnance Center and School Study, "Ordnance Corps Officer Losses." 
However, data from the studies have not been analyzed with the 
view toward assessing the designated communication relationship 
as a contributing factor in voluntary separations. It is hoped 
that completion of the present inquiry will lead to such an 
assessment. 
The author, having been a member of the active Army from 
1966 through 1975, was directly involved with the problem of 
Junior Officer retention. While on active duty, it was the 
author's observation that communication played an important part 
in retaining Junior Officers. Upon release from active duty, the 
author felt that a study should be undertaken to determine the 
scope of the role communication played in Junior Officer separations. 
Procedures 
In this study the following steps have been completed in 
the approximate sequence listed: 
J 
1. A review of existing pertinent literature was conducted 
to determine whether or not any studies had been done on the 
communication relationship between Junior and Senior U.S. Army 
Officers as a factor in voluntary separations from 1966 through 
1970 . 
A two step review was conducted. The first encompassed 
studies completed for or by the U.S. Govern�ent from 1967 through 
the spring of 1976. The second review encompassed studies completed 
in departments of Communication and/or Speech. 
The review of the U.S. Government studies was accomplished 
in the following manner: 
A. Review of the U. S. Government Re rts Announcements from 
1966 through March 197 under Corporate Titles, Department of 
Army, Department of Defense, Franklin Institute of Research, 
and the U.S. Military Academy, West Point. (See Table I, 
page 4.) 
B. Review of the U.S. Government Reports Announcements from 
1966 through March 1976 under Subject Titles, Communication, 
Leadership, Personnel Management, and Speech. (See Table I, 
page 4.) 
In conducting the review of the government sources A and 
B above, six studies were tentatively identified as possibly dealing 
with a subject similar to that in the present investigation. 
( 1) "Career Motl va tion of Army Personnel--Junior 
Officers' Duties," Technical Report 1-212, Volumes I & II, 
Franklin Institute of Research Project C2081, Sept. , 1968 . 
This study is being used in the present investigation. 
4 
TABLE I 
GOVERNMENT REPORTS ANHOUNCEMENT REVIEW BY 
YEAR, CORPORATE TITLE, AlrD SUBJECT 
Dept Dept 
of of 
Year Army Def. F.I.R. USMA COMM LDRSHP PERMGT SPEECH 
1966 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
1967 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
1968 NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO 
1969 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
1970 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
1971 NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES 
1972 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
1973 YES NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
1974 YES NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
1975 YES NO NO NO NO NO YES NO 
1976 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
(2) "Survey of Careerists and Non-Careerists from 
the USMA Classes 1963-1967 (A Product Appraisal Report), " 
Robert P. Butler, Apr '71, 50p, Rpt #lXJ.01-71-003, 
U.S . Military Academy, Office of Institutional Research, 
Conducted May '70. AP 730-685, 71-22 05. This report 
deals with the responses of 1250 USMA graduates from 
classes of 1963-1967. A four part survey that was 
conducted in May 1970. The major purpose of the study 
was to gather information about the graduates in six 
major areas: personal background, perceptions of their 
wives' feelings toward several aspects of military life, 
development of skills in various areas, perceptions 
of minority group problems and drug abuse, attitudes 
toward the Army, and attitudes toward items of general 
interest. The respondents were divided into two groups, 
careerists and non-careerists. Statistical tests of 
differences between the two groups for the questionnaire 
items were conducted and it found that responses of the 
careerists and non-careerists differed significantly in 
regard to the majority of items. This implies that the 
two groups can be more clearly �efined by the information 
in the six areas of the report. 
(3) "Closing the Communication Gap, " Warren G. Lawson, 
26 March 1973, 33p, U. S. Army War College, AD 761-575, 
73-15, 0.5A. Interpersonnel C� munications are used 
within the organization to direct all actions. However, 
research has confirmed that most organizational communi­
cation networks are dreadfully inefficient; that the 
threads of meaning which instruct and implement are 
frequently broken resulting in a communication gap. 
5 
Since communication is so important to organizational 
effectiveness, the many barriers impacting on the system 
were studied. Data was collected using literature search 
concentrating on similar problems in the business world, 
and using material developed from study, research, and 
discussion of 25 USAWC students within the Interpersonnel 
Communication Elective (Class of 1973) . From this 
research the most important barriers and gateways of an 
engineering, (physical, physiological) psychological and 
sociological nature are isolated. The paper [sic] designed 
for publication and provided guidance to the military 
commander or supervisor a recommjnded method of improving communications in organizations. 
(4) " The Lines of Communication Program in Vietnam, " 
Nelson P. Convor, 8 March 1973, 60p, AD 762-255, 72-15, 
15G. This study deals with the highway construction 
program in Vietnam. 
(5) "Communication and the Military Executive," 
Edwin D. Heath, Jr., 18 June 1974, 25p, USAWC, AD 
787-264/lGA, 74-26, 051. The purpose of this paper is 
to identify problems which inhibit effective communi­
cation in the large organization and to analyze how 
these problems impact on the military organization and 
to recommend methods and techniqu3s to make more 
effective the military executive. 
(6) "Survey of Factors Relating to the Retention 
of Junior Officers, 11 26 July 197 5, Rpt #DAPC-PMP-4-73-E, 
AD A010-J49-9GA, 51, U.S. Army Military Personnel 
Center, Personnel Management Development Directorate. 
This report is based upon a survey designed to qualify 
factors significant in the career decisions of Junior 
Officers leaving the Army. Data were collected at 16 
selected transfer points during a JO day period beginning 
1 Feb 1972, approximately 1600 Junior Officers were 
included in the sample. 
After careful review of all identified studies in steps 
6 
A and B, it r..as been determined that with the exception of (1) 
above, which is being utilized in the present investigation, there 
were no studies completed or in progress dealing with the communi­
cation relationship between Junior and Senior U.S. Army Officers 
as a factor on voluntary separations from 1966 through 1970. 
The review of Communication and/or Speech areas was 
accomplished in the following manner: 
A. Review of Speech Monographs from 1966 through 1969 
under the following titles: 
(1) Auer, J. Jeffery. "Doctoral Dissertations in 
Speech: Work in Process . "  
(2) Knower, Franklin H. "Graduate Theses: An Index 
of Graduate Work in Speech. " 
(J) Nelson, Max. "Abstracts of Theses in the Field 
of Speech. "  
B. Review of Bibliographic Annual in Speech Communication 
from 1970 through 1973 was accomplished in the following 
manner: 
(1) Auer, J. Jeffery. "Doctoral Dissertations in 
Speech: Work in Process. " 
(2) Nelson, Max. "Graduate Theses: An Index of 
Graduate Work in Speech." 
(3) Nelson, Max. "Abstracts of Theses in the Field 
of Speech." 
C. Review of Bibliographic Annual in Speech Communication 
from 1974 through 1975 was accomplished in the following 
manner: 
7 
(1) Logue, Cal M. "Abstracts of Doctoral Dissertations 
in the Field of Speech Communication." 
(2) Logue, Cal M. " Graduate Theses and Dissertations 
in Speech Communication." 
D. Review of Index to American Doctoral Dissertations 
from 1966 through 1972. 
E. Review of Index to Doctoral Dissertations International 
from 1973 through April 176. 
After careful review of material in A through E above, it 
has been determined that there were no recorded studies completed 
or in process dealing with communication between Junior and Senior 
U. S. Army Officers as a factor in the voluntary separations from 
1966 through 1970. 
2 .  In order that this analysis may be interpreted in 
terms of the environment out of which the designated separations 
occurred, an attempt was made to provide the military historic 
milieu of the period 1966 through 1970. In this effort the 
following sources were used: U.S. Government documents, news 
accounts during the 1966 through 1970 period, and other incidental 
reports. 
8 
J. The study, "Ordnance Corpos Officer Losses"7 (hereafter 
referred to as the Ordnance Study), which was conducted on Ordnance 
Junior Officers who separated from the service between 1966 and 
1970, was in the writer's possession from the outset of this 
inquiry. 
4. From the above mentioned study all items with either 
the body of the question or a response dealing with the communication 
relationship between Junior and Senior Officers were extracted. 
This was done first by the author and then reviewed by the author's 
advisor. Additions and/or deletions to the questions were made 
at that time. The term "communication relationship" is here 
(and hereafter) broadly defined to include the written and the 
oral medium; verbal, non-verbal, and paralinguistic; social and 
professional; formal and informal; and the various rhetorical 
elements of communication--invention, style, arrangement, and 
delivery. 
5. After the items dealing with the communication 
relationship between Junior and Senior Officers had been selected, 
the responses to the selected questions were tabulated. 
6. The study, "Why They Leave: Resignations from the 
USMA Class of 1966118 (hereafter referred to as the West Point 
Study), which was conducted on the 1966 West Point Class members who 
separated from the service between 1968 and 1970, was obtained by 
writing the Superintendent, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, 
New York. 
7. From the above mentioned study all items with either 
9 
the body of the question or a response dealing with the communi­
cation relationship between Junior and Senior Officers were extracted , 
following the method indicated in Step 4. 
8. After the items dealing with the communication relation­
ship between Junior and Senior Officers had been selected, the 
responses to the selected questions were tabulated. 
9. The study, "Career Motivation of Army Personnel--Junior 
Officers' Duties"9 (hereafter referred to as the Franklin Study), 
which was conducted by the Franklin Institute for the U.S. Army 
on an Army-wide problem of Junior Officer retention, was procured by 
writing the Franklin Institute Research Laboratories, Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania. 
10. From the above mentioned study all items with either 
the body of the question or a response dealing with the communi­
cation relationship between Junior and Senior Officers were 
extracted, following the method indicated in Step 4. 
11. After the items dealing with the communication rela­
tionship between Junior and Senior Officers had been selected, 
the responses were tabulated. 
12. Fram the data provided through the above steps, an 
attempt was made to assess the degree, nature, and direction of 
communication between the designated Junior and Senior Officers 
as it related to the decision to separate. 
10 
lJ. Finally, conclusions were drawn concerning the degree, 
nature, and direction of communication between Junior and Senior 
Officers as a factor in the Junior Officers' decision to separate 
from active military service between 1966 and 1970. 
FOOTNOTES 
1The review of Official Officer Personnel Files was con­
ducted by a team of officers from the U.S. Military Academy, West 
Point, and the U.S. Army Ordnance Center and School, of which the 
author was an indirect member. 
2 U. S. Government Reports Announcements from 1966 through 






u .s. Army Ordnance Center and School. "Ordnance Corps 
Officer Losses, " Aberdeen Proving Ground, May 1971. (Typewritten. ) 
8
u.s. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief 
of Staff for Personnel. "Why They Leave: Resignations from the 
USI1A Class of 1966, 11 July, 1970. (Typewritten. ) 
9Franklin Institute of Research. "Career Motivation of 
Army Personnel-Junior Officers' Duties, " Philadelphia, Sept. , 
1968. (Typewritten.) 
CHAPTER II 
THE VIETNAM CONFLICT 
1957 through 1967 
Pre United States Involvement 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a brief historical 
sketch of the Vietnam Conflict in order to determine the environment 
at the time designated U. S. Army Junior Officers voluntarily chose 
to leave active duty. 
The Vietnam War, also called the Second Indochina War, can 
be said to have started in 1957 when Communist-led insurgents 
began mounting terrorists attacks against the government of the 
Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) . The causes of the conflict can 
be traced back to the First Indochina War of 1946-1954. 1 After 
the defeat of Japan in World War II, the French returned to Inda-
china as the colonial administrators but were challenged for 
control by the Viet Minh, the Communist-led Vietnamese nationalists 
who had established a government in northern Vietnam in 1945.2 
The French, in a move designed to give the impression of granting 
independence to Indochina while still retaining control, granted 
sovereignty to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia as "associated states" 
of the French Union in 1949.3 This move allowed the new members 
a seat in the French Parliament, but still gave the ruling party 
in parliament almost total control in the Indochina governments. 
All this, however, was not enough to stop the surge of Communism 
in Southeast Asia .4 In 1950, the United States began supplying 
13 
the " associated states" with economic and military aid, al though 
it was channeled through France . By 1954, the United States had 
furnished $2 billion of financial aid to the French War effort. 5 
The French in 1954 were besieged at the fortress of Dien Bien Phu, 
and in June the French National Assembly submitted to a termination 
of the war . 
By the Geneva Agreement of July 21, 1954, North Vietnam was 
left in the hands of Ho Chi Minh and the South in the control of 
non-Communist nationalists leaders.6 With the division of the two 
Vietnams, the Communists, who were unable to unify and control 
Vietnam through political means and elections, then turned to 
military means to try to unify and control the Vietnams . The 
objective of the Vietnamese Communists remained constant through­
out the war: the over-throw of the r.on-Communist Saigon government 
and its replacement with a regime that would agree to ultimate 
amalgamation with Ho Chi Minh' s  government at Hanoi, in the North. 7 
When ths French were besieged at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, 
a request by the French for assistance was made to the United States. 
The administration of President Dwight D .  Eisenhower gave serious 
consideration tc providing the French with air and ground forces 
8 for support. Marvin Kalb, in his book, Roots of Involvement: The 
U . S. in Asia 1784-1971, states: 
338883 SOUTH DAKOTA STATE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 
Eisenhower determined early in his administration that 
he would strive for peace and quiet. He was not always 
successful. But, on at least one occasion in April 1954, 
when admirals and generals came pounding at the White 
House door for permission to attack and assist the French 
at Dien Bien Phu and other Communist held positions, all 
supported by the Vice President, Secretary of State, and 
members of the Senate, Eisenhower did not yield under 
pressure. He attached conditions t� his consent, which, 
as it turned out, could not be met. 
Without the support requested, the French were defeated and the 
Vietnams were divided. 
The U.S. Becomes Involved 
14 
In accordance with its obligations as a member of the South 
East Asia Treaty Organization, the United States supplied military 
material and equipment at the request of the Republic of Vietnam 
(South Vietnam) . A Military Assistance and Advisory Group was 
established to supervise and coordinate this support program. 
This commitment for support was made by President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower on 10 October 1954. In 1955, the Military Assistance 
and Advisory Group was given the authority by the Department of 
Defense to organize and train as well as equip the armed forces of 
South Vietnam as defined in the agreement signed by President 
Eisenhower in 19.54.10 
In 1957, the Communist organization in South Vietnam (the 
Viet Cong) initiated a campaign of terror to undermine the authority 
of the central government. This campaign included the assassination 
and kidnapping of governmental officials and supporters. By 1960, 
the number of assassinations reached 1400, and over 700 kidnappings 
had occurred. President John F. Kennedy approved the request for 
additional aid in 1961 with the increase of 16,000 U. S. Military 
11 
advisory personnel. As the communist pressure increased and 
the military requirements increased, the Military Assistance 
Command, Vietnam (MACY) was created in February 1962.
12 
15 
On JO July 1964, South Vietnamese naval craft raided 
islands in the Gulf of Tonkin north of the 17th parallel. The 17th 
parallel was the dividing parallel line between North and South 
Vietnam as set by the Geneva Agreement of 21 July 1954. Two United 
States Navy destroyers were patrolling near South Vietnamese naval 
craft. North Vietnamese naval PT boats (Patrol Torpedo Boat, a 
small, highly maneuverable vessel, armed with torpedoes for action 
against enemy.shipping), probably pursuing the South Vietnamese 
naval craft, attacked the two United States Navy destroyers. Two 
North Vietnamese PT boats were sunk by the U. S. destroyers, and 
U. S. warplanes bombed the North Vietnamese PT boat base. This 
was the first reported U.S. attack on North Vietnamese territory.13 
After the Gulf of Tonkin incident, President Johnson asked 
Congress for powers "to take all necessary measures to repel any 
armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent 
f th . ..14 ur er aggression. Congress granted these powers by an over-
whelming vote, though some Congressmen later stated they misunder­
stood the full implications of this action. Nevertheless, President 
Johnson used the resolution as the chief legal basis for the U.S. 
support of the South Vietnamese in the war. The Gulf of Tonkin 
resolution was repealed by the United States Congress in June 
1970. 15 
As of early March 1956, no decision had been reached by 
the United States on intervention with ground forces into the 
16 
war, other than limited Marine Security force deployed to protect 
Da Nang, South Vietnam. Da Nang is a major port and city in South 
Vietnam, just below the 17th parallel. However, President Johnson 
ordered air attacks over North Vietnam on military targets in 
early May 1965. Due to the grave tactical situation reported to 
President Johnson by MACV and South Vietnamese government sources, 
President Johnson directed the deployment of U. S. combat forces, 
using the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution as the basis for legally sending 
in the forces. At the Hawaiian Conference 9-11 April 1965, the 
Secretary of Defense approved the plan for sending the first combat 
troops to Vietnam. The 173rd Airborn Brigade began arriving in 
South Vietnam on 21 April 1965. This was just the beginning of the 
16 accelerated build up. President Johnson, being advised by the 
Commander of HACV, General William C .  Westmorland, that the South 
Vietnamese could not survive very long without more U. S. combat 
forces to assist the government of South Vietnam in its fight 
against the communist forces, decided in mid-July to actively 
commit the United States combat forces to the aid of South Vietnam.17 
The Vietnam Conflict was quite different from that for 
which the United States Army had been trained. The Vietnam War 
17 
was fought essentially by small uni ts in constant pursui-t of an 
elusive enemy. In stark contrast to World War II and Korea, which 
had major offensive and defensive battles with large numbers of 
combat forces facing each other over defined linear front lines, 
Vietnam was characterized largely by small, isolated actions con­
sisting of ground and air assaults mounted from numerous isolated 
base camps dotting the countryside. There were no fixed terrain 
objectives. When some key terrain feature was at issue, it was 
usually for a limited purpose and a designated time. 18 Lieutenant 
General John H. Hay, Jr. , in his monograph, Tactical and Material 
Innovations in Vietnam, stated: 
For the U.S. Army, the war in Vietnam presented a new 
type of battle fought with new weapons and new tactics 
against a very different enemy. The tactics and 
methods of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong soldiers 
did not fit the patterns established by enemy forces 
in War ld War II and the Korean War. This fact was 
especially evident during the stages of the insurgency 
when the enemy's main force units tried to avoid heavy 
contact in favor of terrorism and ambush . Another 
difference was that all of South Vietnam was a war 
arena with shifting scenes of combat in comparison to 
the rigidity imposed by narrow front lines character­
istic of past conflicts. 19 
There was no neat, linear division between enemy and 
friendly forces; no front lines; and no rear boundaries. Consequent­
ly, there was neither a communications zone nor a combat zone. In 
fact, the combat zone and the communications zone were one and the 
same. The Department of the Army defines communications zone 
and combat zone as follows: 
The communications zone (COMJ1Z) comprises the area from 
the rear boundary of the combat zone to the rear boundary 
of the theater of operations. The COMI'1Z is regarded as 
essentially a time and distance void between the comLat 
force and its manpower and material replenishment. The 
combat zone is that part of the theater of operations 20 
required by combat troups for the conduct of operations. 
18 
At no time during the duration of the war were there any really 
"secure" areaG within Vietnam. The adaptation of the U. S. forces 
to the countrywide battlefield evolved through a process of trial 
and error. Success was not clear-cut; control of the population 
was often in doubt; victory or defeat lay at the grass-roots level. 
Thus, there were two wars going on: the purely military battle 
against the enemy's main force, and the pacification operation. 
Pacification is the process of establishing or reestablishing 
effective local self-government within the political framework 
of the legitimate central government and its constitution. 21 
As the problems of the South Vietnamese government increased 
in the country, with communist forces taking more and more territory, 
steps were being taken in the United States to further involve 
the country in a conflict more than 5,000 miles from its shores. 
1965 Through 1970 
The Buildup 
The Secretary of Defense during the Hawaii Conference on 
April 9-11, 1965, on the defense of Southeast Asia and the 
Vietnamese situation, approved the first major troop buildup, with 
an Army Combat force of over JJ,000 troops. The first of these 
troops were to arrive in South Vietnam on 21 April 1965. (See 
Chart I and Table II, pages 20 and 21. ) 
19 
After the April Conference in Hawaii, the Military 
Assis tance Command, Vietnam requested that forces would be required 
to support the action in South Vietnam . However, the number of 
troops approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense was 
always less than the number requested by the Military Assistance 
22 Command, Vietnam. 
United States Forces were built up in an unbalanced 
manner. Continued enemy pressure on the beleaguered government of 
South Vietnam and manpower ceilings combined to cause an inadequate 
defense base in relation to the total force level. By 1967 the 
communists were closer to victory than ever. American bases 
populated the coast of South Vietnam, and the U. S. presence there 
neared 500, 000. At each level of escalation General William 
W estmoreland, Commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 
kept talking about "the light at the end of the tunnel" and repeated 
that his last request would be sufficient, only to argue that only 
100, 000 more men would be enough. As President Johnson reported 
these platitudes and examples of wishful thinking to the American 
people, they began seriously to question the wi sdom of going into 
Vietnam in the first place. America found itself in a position 
similar to that of France in the early 1950' s, stepping up the war 
effort while the political position of her leadership crumbled under 
criticism of the war at home.23 During the period from mid-1966 
20 
CHART I 
AUTHORIZED TROOP LEVEL Ir  SOUTH VIETNAM 
--600 , 000 549 . 5  20 Jan 69 
--500, 000 
4 4 . 0  
- -400 , 000 
--300 , 000 
- -200, 000 
--100 , 000 
0 6 1  62 63 64 66 67 68 70 
Chart I shows the manpower ceilings set by the Office of 
the Secretary o f  Defense. 
71 72 
Source: Department o f  the Army, Vietnam Studies, Logistic Support, 
Washington , D . C. 1974, page 13 . 
TABLE II  
U. S. ARMY AND TOTAL U . S. MI LITARY 
PERSONNEL IN SOUTH VIETNAM 
Date U. S .  Army Personnel Total Military 
Jl Dec 1960 800 900 
Jl Dec 1961 2, 100 J, 200 
Jl Dec 1962 7, 900 11, JOO 
Jl Dec 1963 10, 100 16, JOO 
Jl Dec 1964 14, 700 2J, JOO 
Jl Mar 1965 15, 600 29, 100 
31 Dec 1965 116, 800 184, JOO 
Jl Mar 1966 137, 400 231, 200 
31 Dec 1966 239, 400 485, JOO 
31 Mar 1967 264, 600 420, 900 
Jl Dec 1967 319, 500 485, 600 
31 Mar 1968 337, JOO 515, 200 
31 Dec 1968 359, 800 536 . 100 
*31 Jan 1969 365, 600 542, 400 
31 Mar 1969 361, 500 538, 200 
31 Dec 1969 330, 300 474, 400 
Jl Mar 1970 321, 400 448, 500 
Jl Dec 1970 250, 700 335, 800 
31 Mar 1971 227, 600 301, 900 
J Jun 1971 197, 500 250, 900 
*Indicates peak strength in South Vietnam 
Between 1954-1960 U.S. Military Strength averaged � about 
650 advisors . 
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Source: Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies, Logistic Support, 
Washington, D.C., 1974, page 14. 
to mid-1969, the authorized strength of U. S. forces in South 
Vietnam rose from about 276, 000 men to a peak of 549, 000. 
The Pullout 
The United States balance of payments deficit between 
1960-1968 was soaring, with the United States spending 16 billion 
dollars more than it received from abroad, according to the U. S. 
News and World Report, April 1, 1968. The position of the U. S. 
dollar in world markets was weakening, thus adding to world 
inflation, according to the American Bankers Association in U. S. 
News and World Report, August 14, 1967. This was due in part to 
the U. S. having the only economy in the Western world that was on 
anything like a wartime basis. U. S. inflation was being exported 
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to Europe and Japan as the vicious spiral escalated with every 
increase of the war effort. As government platitudes to the public 
masked a growing despair in circles surrounding President Johnson, 
riots and demonstrations spread. Anti-war manifestations were 
joined by civil rights riots which grew in ferocity and destruction. 
24 The United States was losing the Vietnam War at home. As the 
U.S. escalated the war in Vietnam, protest activity also escalated. 
The year 1965 saw not only the beginning of the U.S.' s bombing 
of North Vietnam on a round-the-clock basis but also a great 
number of teach-ins, marches, demonstrations, and other forms of 
protest against the war. 25 
The anti-draft movement became a most important branch of 
the anti-Vietnam War movement. The development seemed logical. 
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W ith no draft, the war in Vietnam co uld not be fought ; there would 
be too few to fight in it. Therefore , anyone who was against the 
war should be against the draft also. Yet i t  was not until the 
anti -draft protest began to concentrate its act ivities on the 
co llege campuses that the anti -war and anti -draft movements came 
26 
together . 
President Johnson ' s  credibi lity reached new lows at a time 
when he planned to launch his re-election campaign . U . S .  News and 
World Report , August 21, 1967 stated: 
There is a real and growing concern among Democrats in 
Congress and the White House as they size up the po litical 
outlook for the 1968 election year . The combined 
irritations of war , riots, and spending programs have 
dr iven LBJ ' s  popularity down to 39%, the lowest he has 
received during his 45 2onths in office according to 
the latest Gallup poll . 7 
The U . S. won a surprising v ictory o ver the Communist forces , with 
the defeat of the NLF ( National Liberation Front ) , and the 
VC ( Viet Cong)  at Hue to end the 1968 TET Offensive started in 
January 1968 . Meanwhile , pressure to step down as President 
mounted in the country as the anti -war demonstrations continued . 
On March 10, 1968, General Westmoreland informed President Johnson 
that he wou ld need 206, 000 more men in Vietnam , when the American 
presence already stood at o ver half a million. President Johnson 
was then told by the Secretary of the Treasury and his economic 
advisors that j f  further escalation was contemplated, America 
would be forced to devalue the dollar in order to meet the costs 
2 8  of  the war . 
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On March Jl, 1968, President Johnson decided not to seek 
re-election. He knew he was beaten, not on the battlefield but 
politically. President Johnson withdrew for a number of reasons 
but, basically, because "he was fed up, " beaten down by attacks 
from within his own party , unable to persuade a Democratic Congress 
to cooperate in any field, as reported by U.S. News and World 
Report, April 15 , 1968.29 No candidate could run or hope to win 
on a promise of four more years of war. The public, disillusioned 
with Democratic war policies for the past eight years and shattered 
by the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy, 
turned to Richard Nixon. For the first time during the war the 
Communists were on the defensive, their TET offensive in the south 
a failure. Their best units destroyed, their carefully hoarded 
supplies near exhaustion, the Viet Cong and N LF were in no position 
to mount another offensive for years . For the first time the 
Communists were on the defensive just at the moment when America 
lost its wi ll to fight. 30 
In June 1969, President Nixon announced the first U.S. 
force withdrawals, and graduated reductions continued from then 
on.31 But the war was far from over. President Nixon announced 
a policy of "Vietnamization" of the war, which was a cover word 
meaning a slow American withdrawal from Indochina while ARYN 
(Army of the Republic of Vietnam) was trained and equipped to 
maintain its newly-won positions. Despite continuing American 
withdrawals, President Nixon gave in to the Pentagon ' s  request to 
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attack North Vietnamese bases in Cambodia in April, 1970. The 
public reaction, in the United States, to this raid was violent. 
Congress opposed this apparent re-escalation of the war, and Presi­
dent Nixon was obligated to withdraw U . S .  troops from Cambodia in 
July, 1970. The attack encouraged the American public and Congress 
to urge President Nixon to step up the American withdrawal from 
Indochina . 32 
By 1972 the United States still had over 100, 000 men in 
Indochina, it was another election year, and President Nixon was up 
for reelection. Just before the November elections the Secretary 
of State, Henry Kissinger, announced that the end of the war was 
at hand . President Nixon won an overwhelming victory at the polls, 
and in 1973 the last American troops left Indochina . 33 
War Attitudes at Home 
At a time when .a note of optimism was beginning to creep 
into the intelligence reports on the progress of the war in Vietnam, 
pessimism suddenly took hold in the United States . The war, as 
far as American s were concerned, appeared to be running toward a 
showdown between the administration of President Johnson and the 
J4 American people . 
Signs showed that the public--with an election drawing 
closer--was becoming more and more insistent that the war in 
Vietnam either be won or de-escalated by an American pull back .JS 
Polls, mail to congress, sentiment--sounding at the grass 
roots--all showed that the people were becoming increasingly 
irritated and impatient with a war that kept dragging 
on and on. Disappointment with the causes of the war was 
evident everywhere, casualties were reaching new highs, progress 
that had been promised had not materialized, and the South 
Vitenamese forces were not perceived as taking or accepting their 
fair share of the responsibility for the fighting. 36 
The following list of articles from the New York Times 
illustrates public attitudes and sentiment about the war: 
President Nixon refers to some campus radicals who oppose 
his Vietnamese policies as " bums," contrasting them with 
American soldiers whom he calls "the greatest." (May 1, 
1970) 
A blast of gun fire from the National Guard kills four 
University Students, two of them young women, at Kent 
(Ohio) State University. Eight other students are 
wounded. The shooting came shortly after guardsmen 
used tear gas to break up a noon rally of 1, 000 students 
protesting the widening of the war in Indochina. (May 
4, 1970) 
Student demonstrators across the country step up their 
protests against the Indochina war and demonstrate 
their bitterness engendered by the Kent State killings. 
(May 5, 1970) 
Colleges across the nation close down in anti-war dem­
onstra tions for periods ranging from a day to the 
remainder of the term. (May 6, 1970) 
An anti-war crowd of between 75, 000-100 , 000 drawn mostly 
from the nation ' s  campuses, demonstrate near the White 
House. (Nay 9, 1970) 
The Hatfield-McGovern " amendment to end the war" is 
defeated (55-39) in the Senate by a coalition of 
Republicans and Southern Democrat s. The amendment 
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was designed to withdraw all Amer��ans from Vietnam by the end of 197 1 . (Sept . 1, 1970 ) 
" Unrest" on the American campuses and elsewhere in the 
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United States among the American people grew, and even the government 
itself was divided over the Indochina policies of the various 
administrations since the start of the Vietnam War in 1965. It was 
this " unrest" that in the end caused the final and eventual with­
drawal of all American forces from Vietnam in 1973 . 3
8 
Military War Attitudes 
As the "unrest" grew at home with the American people, so 
did the "unrest" grow within the military system, especially 
among those young men serving in the war zone itself, Vietnam . 
The Pentagon reported a total of 495, 689 cases of desertion from 
August 1964 through December 1972 . 39 
An example of the problem within the service is  based on 
personal experience and personal observations of the author 
during his to'.lI' of duty in Vietnam from May 1969 through May 1970 . 
The major problem observed was that of lack of respect for those 
in command and the orders they were to carry out in connection 
with the duties the young soldier was expected to complete . Drugs 
were everywhere and easy to purchase for small sums of money . 
They were used as a means of escaping something that was unpleasant. 
Alcohol was also used excessively as a means of escape. 
The problems of the soldier grew as he/she learned of the 
situation at home. Draft dodgers, deserters, protests, and riots 
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all played their part in making an already unpleasant job even more 
unpleasant. 
The young officers were also dissatisfied with the way 
things were. Orders from above were often unreasonable and for 
the most part unrealistic . So it was no wonder that the young 
soldier had problems and was dissatisfied with the way things were. 
His only recourse was to rebel, which he did with great vigor 
against anything which represented authority.40 
Increased Junior Officer Separations 
During the period between 1966 and 1970, a large number of 
U.S. Army Junior Officers chose to leave the Army for civilian 
careers. Retention of Junior Officers during the 15 years preceding 
1970, show in Table III (See page 29 , )  and Table IV (See page JO.), 
shows that 1970 had the lowest level of retention in more than 10 
41 years. This level of retention was of great concern to military 
leaders . Their concern over this high incidence of Junior Officer 
separations led to a number of studies: Franklin Institute of 
Research, "Career Motivation of Army Personnel--J unior Officers' 
Duties ; 1 1 42 U. S. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief 
of Staff for Personnel, "Why They Leave: Resignations from the 
USMA Class of 1966 ; 11 43 and the U. S. Army Ordnance Center and School, 
"Ordnance Corps Officer Losses . 1 1 44 This study, using the data 
provided in the above studies, represents an attempt to determine 
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TABLE III  
PAST RETENTION EXPERIENCE 
Number Eligible 
Fiscal Yr. to Leave Number Retained Retention Rate % 
1956 7, 672 1, 404 18 . J 
1957 13, 535 2, 5Jl 18 . 7  
1958 8, 094 1, 716 21 .2  
1959 7, 224 1, 835 25. 4 
1960 5, 713 1, 634 28.6 
1961 4, 547 1, 687 37. 1  
1962 5, 680 1, 920 33. 8  
1963 6, 453 2, 136 33 . 1  
1964 9, 216 2, 092 22. 7 
1965 10, 201 2, 540 24 . 9  
1966 11, 349 2 , 894 2.5 . .5 
1967 10, 486 2, 307 22. 0 
1968 11, 624 2, 813 24. 2  
1969 27, 083 7, 502 27. 7 
1970 30, 2.58 5, 628 18. 6 
Note: The retention rate is the percent extending on 
active duty in a Voluntary Category out of those eligible to 
leave the service . The number eligible to leave are those who 
have completed their obligated term of service during the fiscal 
year. 
Source: U. S. , Department of the Army, Headquarters, 
Department of the Army Pamphlet Number 601-4, Commanders " Guide 
to the Retention of Junior Officers (Washington, D.C. : Government 
Printing Office , November 1970), pp. 1-1-1-J. 
TABLE IV 
U . S .  ARMY STRENGTH BY GRADE 
Rank 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
2nd LT 20 , 353 ( 19 . 1) 32 , 981 ( 25 . 9 )  35 , 466 (24 . J ) 27 , 706 ( 18 . 6 )  2 8, 2JO ( 19 . 6 )  
1st LT 15 , 824 ( 14 . 9 ) 18 , 685 ( 14 , 7 ) 29 , 738 (20 . 4) 33 , 267  ( 22 . 4) 25 , 938  (18 . 0 ) 
CPT J2 , J1J ( J0 . 1 ) 34 , 156 ( 26 . 8) 3 5 , 180 ( 2 4 . 1) 38, 796 ( 26 . 1 ) 43 , 717 ( J0 . 4) 
MAJ 18 , 534 ( 17 . 4) 20 , 470 ( 16 . 1) 22 , 903 ( 15 , 7) 25 , 205 ( 16 . 9 ) 2J , 447 ( 16 . J ) 
LTC 1J , 51J ( 12 . 7 )  14, 841 ( 11 . 6 )  16 , 336 ( 11 . 2 )  16 , 806 ( 11 . J )  15 , 481 ( 10 . 8) 
COL 5 , 428 ( 5  . 1 ) .5 , 743 ( 4 . 5 )  6 , 024 ( 4 . 1 ) 6 , 537  ( 4 . 4) 6 , J76 (4 . 4) 
GEN 503 (0 . 5 ) 517 ( 0 . 4) J41 (0 . 2 )  519 ( O . J ) 514 ( 0 . 5 ) 
Total 
Strength 106 , 468 127 , 393 145 , 988 148 , 836 14J , 70J 
Source : Military Personnel J?igures from the Military Personnel Center Courtesy of 
Department of the Army, Public Affairs, Public Information Office Division, Washington, D.C. 
\..,..) 
0 
how great a factor poor communication and a communication break­
down may have been in the decision of the Junior Officer to 
separate himself from active military service. 
Jl 
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CHAPTER I II 
CONMUNI CA TION BETWEEI� JUNIOR AND 
SENIOR U . S .  ARNY OFFICERS 
The intent in this chapter is to provide the reader with 
evidence from three U . S . Army Studies concerning Junior Off icer 
Retention . These studies were examined and data on the communication 
relationship between Junior and Senior U. S .  Army Officers have 
been abstracted. 
Between 1966-1970 , the U . S . Army became aware of a problem 
with retention of U . S .  Army Junior Officers . Each year there was 
a large number of Junior Officers leaving the Army for civilian 
life. A pproximately 81 . J6% of the Junior Officers on active duty 
elected to leave after having completed more than two years , but 
less than four years , of active commissioned service , as determined 
by the review of U .S .  Army Military Personnel records at St. Louis , 
I1o. , in April 1971 . 1 This was a costly drain of talent . Major 
General F .  W. Gobe , Jr . ,  Chief of Personnel Operation , Headquarters 
Department of the Army , stated: 
It is generally accepted that a decision to choose a 
particular profession , including the military , as a 
life time career is not done on a moment ' s reflection ; 
it is a gradual growth , influenced by the individual ' s  
day to day contact with others including the individual ' s  
Senior Officer whose influence is significant i n  career 
decisions .2 
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DAPM 601-4 reported retention of Junior Officers was below 
expectations, in 1966--2 , 894 ( 25. 5%) retained; in 1967--2 , 307 ( 22 . 0fo) 
retained; in 1968--2 , 813 ( 24. 2% ) retained; in 1969--7 , 502 ( 27 . 7%) ; 
and in 1970 --5, 62 8  ( 18. 6%)  retained, J the U . S. Army attempted to 
find out why. The Army ' s  efforts to learn more about the problem 
of Junior Officer retention were primarily centered on three 
studies. The first study used is by The Franklin Institute of 
Research, " Career Motivation of Army Personnel--Junior Officers 
Duties, "  hereafter referred to as the "Franklin Study. " The second 
is by the U.S. Department of the Army , Office of the Deputy Chief 
of Staff for Personnel, " Why They Leave: Resignations from the 
United States Military Academy Class of 1966 , " hereafter referred 
to as the "West Point Study. " The third is by the U.S. Army 
Ordnance Center and School Study, "Ordnance Corps Officer Losses, " 
hereafter referred to as the "Ordnance Study. " 
Three Studies 
The Franklin Study was completed in 1968 , the West Point 
Study in 1970 ,  and the Ordnance Study in 1971 . All dealt with 
aspects of military life which affect the career decisions of 
the Junior Officer. However, after a detailed review of each 
study, it became apparent that in the final results a clear assess­
ment had not been made concerning the communication relationship 
between the Junior Officer and his Senior Officer in relation to 
career decisions . Therefore, this current study was undertaken to 
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evaluate the data given in the light of the specific communication 
r elationship between Junior Officers and Senior Officers as it 
affected the J un ior Officers ' decision to separate from the Army. 
The Franklin Study 
The Franklin Study was directed toward identifying the 
relationships among the various factors that influence Junior 
Officer Army career decisions. The objectives of the study were 
to : 
1 .  Determine the relationship between extrinsic 
factors such as pay , duty assignments , and fr inge 
benefits , and intrinsic factors such as pride , 
challenge , satisfaction ,  and independence . 
2. Determine the relationship between extrinsic and 
intrinsic factors and Junior Officer retention. 
J . Specify what changes in the extrinsic factors ar e 
most  likely to influence the intrinsic factors , 
and thereby improve Junior Officer retention. 
In  the study, special emphasis was given to duty assignments , 
car eer management , duties and their content and career counseling . 
The group selected for study was company grade officers with more 
than six months but less than five years of active federal 
commissioned service . The study was performed for the Deputy 
Chief of Staff for Personnel , Depar tment of the Army , by Systems 
Science Depar tment of the Franklin Institu te R esearch Laborator ies 
of Philadelphia , Pennsylvania , September 1968 . 4 
J S  
The West Point S tudy 
The W est Point study was directed toward learning why 2J . 1% 
of the members of the USHA Class of 1966 tendered their r esignations 
from the service . 
The study addressed itself to the resignation problem by 
seeking the reasons and answers to three questions . 
1 .  Why did the members of the U SMA Class of 1966 
r esign? 
2 .  How does the quality of the resign e es compare 
with that of the stay-ins? 
J. What can be done to reduce resignations when 
the USMA classes becom e eligible to leave the 
Army? 
The study was conduct ed by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Personnel , Washington , D. C . ,  J uly 1970 . 5 
The Ordnance Study 
The Ordnance Study was directed toward learning why 466 
Ordnance Officers chose to leave the military service after 
having completed mor e  than two years, but less than four years , 
of active duty, and identifying those factors that influenced the 
Junior Officers ' career decisions. 
The study addressed itself to four sources of influence 
in Junior Officer retention: 
1 .  Civilian vs . military car eer oppor tunities . 
2. The effect of R epublic of Viet Nam tour 
of duty on the career decision. 
J .  The effect of a terminal RVN tour of d uty on the 
career decision. 
4 .  Other factors, as indicated by the survey question­
naire responses, which affected the career 
decision . 
The study was conducted by the Personnel Management 
Division, Office of the Secretary , U . S. Army Ordnance Center and 
Schoo 1 ,  Aberdeen Proving Ground , Mary land , May 1971. 
6 
Method of Analysis 
J9 
Completion of a search for related research revealed no 
studies which dealt primarily with communicat.ion or the lack of 
communication or which attempted to discover if poor communication 
between Junior and Senior Officers was a factor in Junior Officer 
retention . 
In the studies being analyzed for this project, the 
researcher observed numerous questions which dealt with the 
communication relationship between Junior and Senior Officers. 
However , there had been no effort to interpret responses to those 
communication questions as a whole unit and draw conclusions from 
them. It is the intent of this study to do so . 
The communication questions in each study were selected , 
based on the researcher ' s own experience with communication and 
whether the body of the question or a response dealt with a communi­
cation relationship between Junior and Senior Officers . All 
questions selected , together with the full text of the studies , were 
submitted to the thesis advisor, and agreement was achieved as to 
which questions were to be considered " communi cat ion quest ions . " 
( See Chapter 1, page 8 ,  paragraph 4 . ) 
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Each question in each study was analyzed based on the above 
criteria . A breakdown by study as to the number of communication 
questions vs. total questions is as follows : 
To tal Communications 
Questions Questions 
a. The Fran klin Study 424 41 (9 . 7%) 
b. The W est Point Study 70 14 ( 20% )  
c. The Ordnance Study 116 28  ( 24% ) 
610 83(13 . 6%)  
The remainder of this chapter is divided into four parts . 
Par t one contains an analysis of i tems dealing with communication 
selected from the Fran klin Study .  Part two consists of an analysis 
of items d ealin� with communication selected from the West Point 
Study. Part three  includes a similar analysis of items selected 
from the Ordnance Study. Finally , part four is a summary of the 
chapter. 
Franklin Institute of Research Study 
The Franklin Study was directed toward identifying the 
relationships among various factors that influence Junior Officer 
Army car eer decisions . The group selected for study was company 
grade officers with mor e than six mo nths, but less than five years, of 
active federal commissioned service. 
The Franklin Study questionnaire was distributed to more 
than 4, 500 Junior Officers. Responses were collected from 2 , 977 
Junior Officers. 
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All questions and answers in the Franklin Study were based 
on an attitudinal scale. The intensity index was based on the 
scale from onP. ( 1) to seven (7 )  which the respondents used on the 
surveys . Checking one (1) meant the reason had little or no 
influence on the individual. A two (2) or three (J) meant the 
reason had limited influence on the individual. A four (4) meant 
the reason had a moderate influence on the individual. A five (5) 
or six (6) meant the reason had a strong influence on the individual, 
and a seven ( 7) meant the reason had a decisive influence on the 
individual. If all 2 , 977 respondents had checked the "7" column, 
the overall  intensity index for the question would appear as 
seven. If, however, 1, 500 had checked seven (7)  and 1, 477 had 
checked one (1),  the intensity index would be the sum of 1, 500 x 7 
and 1 , 477 x 1 ,  with the total divided by 2 , 977 or 4 . 02 . Since 
some questions were worded in such a manner that the more desirable 
response, indicating a positive communication relationship, was 
at the lower end of the scale, the scale needed to be inverted 
before the Intensity Index was computed ( See H-4, H-12, and H-15.). 
In computing the Mean Intensity Index for the entire study less 
the communication questions, the same inversion was followed for 
"negatively'' phrased questions. 
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Those questions with fewer than, or more than, seven 
responses were not included in the intensity index. However, they 
were considered when an analysis of the study was performed. 
The questions selected from the Franklin Study, on the basis 






















I - 1 
I- 2 
I - 3 
I - 5 
I - 6 







Recognized my individual contributions 
Give constructive c:ri ticism 
Listen to my suggestions 
Critique me in front of others 
Commend me for good work 
Give me the opportunity for independent action and 
initiative 
Treat me as a mature person 
Are inspiring leaders 
Exhibit integrity 
Expect high quality work from me 
Give me counsel and guidance when needed 
Pass the buck 
Communicate their orders clearly 
Show concern for welfare of their subordinates 
Over supervise 
Consider "inexperience" in their evaluation of 
Junior Officers 
Understand the problems of Junior Officers 
Are objective in their Efficiency Ratings 
Assume responsiblity for their mistakes 
Do you believe that Senior Officers utilized the 
Efficiency Reporting System in such a manner as 
to assume that the most qualified Junior Officers 
are selected for promotion? 
What effect do your relationships with Senior 






Sensitivity to others 
Respect for fellow officers 
.Leadership 
Integrity 











Ability to communicate 
Ability to make decisions 
Sensitivity to others 
Ability to accept and follow orders 
Officer Efficiency Reports 
How many formal or informal career-counseling 
interviews have you had with your Senior Officers? 
What was the attitude of your career counselor 
towards you and your career? 
What effect have these career-counseling sessions 
had on your career decision? 
In analysis of the Franklin Study, the series of 
questions and answers are on the basis of the J unior Officers ' 
experience. The Junior Officer was to indicate the extent to 
which each statement described the Senior Officer under whom the 
Junior Officer served. Answers were based on an attitudinal 
scale . 
H- 1 Recognized my individual contributions 
1 .  Highly inaccurate 119 respondents 4% 
2 . 179 I I  6% 
Intensity J . 298 t i  10% 
Index 4 .  Somewhat accurate 893 f l  JO% 
4 . 49 5 .  714 ti 24% 
6 .  566 ti  19% 
7 .  Highly accurate 208 t i  7% 
The majority of resp cndents felt that their Senior Officers 
recognized their individual contributions to the unit to which 
they were assigned. This response was mildly positive in nature 
toward communication between Junior and Senior Officers. 
H- 2 Give constructive criticism 
1 . Highly inaccurate 179 respondents 6% 
2.  208 , , 7fo 
Intensity J .  387 I I  13% 
Index 4 .  Somewhat accurate 685 t i  23% 
4 . 52 5 . 714 " 24% 
4J 
6 . 




The majority of respondents felt that they were given constructive 
criticism. The 4. 52 intensity index constituted moderately 
positive communication response. 
H- 3 Listen to my suggestions 
1 .  Highly inaccurate 208 respondents 7% 
2. 208 t i  7% 
Intensity J .  J27 " 11% 
Index 4. Somewhat accurate 655 " 22°/4 
4. 46 5 . 685 " 2.3% 
6. 566 " 19% 
7. Highly accurate 298 " l(}J/4 
The majority of respondents felt their Senior Officers listened to 
their suggestions. This again constituted a moderately positive 
communication response. 
H- 4 Critique me in front of others 
7. Highly inaccurate 774 respondents 26% 
6. 506 t i  17% 
Intensity 5. 476 .. 16% 
Index 4. Somewhat accurate 625 I I  2}S{ 
4. 97 3 .  298 " 10',i& 
2. 149 II 5% 
1 .  Highly accurate 119 " 4% 
In this instance "critique me in front of others" represents an 
und e�i  able (negative) communication practice. Therefore, the 
rating of 1 is more desirable and the scale was inverted before 
the intensity index was computed. 
H- 5 Commend me for good work 
1 .  Highly inaccurate 179 respondents 6% 
2. 208 " 77/o 
Intensity J. 2J8 " 8,% 
Index 4 .  Somewhat accurate 655 " 22% 
4. 62 5. 685 " 23% 
6 . 





The majority of individuals felt that their Senior Officers did 
commend them for good work, thus a moderately positive communication 
response. 
H - 6 Give me the opportunity for independent action and 
initiative 
1 .  Highly inaccurate 327 respondents 11% 
2 .  238 " 8% 
Intensity 3. 298 f l  10% 
Index 4 .  Somewhat accurate 536 " 18% 
4 . 42 5 . 566 " 19% 
6 .  595 " 20% 
7 . Highly accurate 417 " 14% 
The majority of individuals felt that they were given some 
opportunity for independent action and initiative. This constitutes 
a moderately positive communication response. 
H- 7 Treat me as a mature person 
1 .  Highly inaccurate 179 respondents 6% 
2 . 119 " 4% 
Intensity 3 . 179 I I  6% 
Index 4. Somewhat accurate 447 " 15% 
5 . 12 5 .  506 " 17% 
6. 804 II 27/o 
7 .  Highly accurate 714 " 24% 
The majority of individuals felt that they were treated as mature 
individuals. The 5 . 12 intensity index constitutes a more positive 
communication response. 
H- 8 Are inspiring leaders 
1 .  Highly inaccurate 327 respondents 1 1% 
2 .  298 ,, 10% 
Intensity J. 357 " 12% 
Index 4 . Somewhat accurate 744 II  25% 
4.05 5 .  566 II 19% 
6. 447 respondents 15% 
7. Highly accurate 208 , , 7% 
The majority felt that their leaders were inspiring. A neutral 
communication response is indicated by the intensity index . 
H- 9 Exhibit integrity 
1. Highly inaccurate 149 respondents 
2. 179 " 6% 
Intensity J . 268 " 
Index 4. Somewhat accurate 655 " 22% 
4. 75 5 . 625 " 21% 
6 .  685 " 23% 
7. Highly accurate 447 " 15% 
The majority of individuals felt that their Senior Officers did 
exhibit integrity . This constitutes a moderately poSitive 
communication response. 
H-10 Expect high quality work from me 
1.  Highly inaccurate JO respondents 1% 
2. JO " 1% 
Intensity J . 60 I I  2% 
Index 4 .  Somewhat accurate 327 . . 11% 
5 . 83 5 .  476 II 16% 
6. 982 " 33% 
7. Highly accurate 1072 I I  36% 
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The majority of res:rx:mdents felt that their superiors expected high 
quality work from them. The intensity index indicates a strong 
positive communication response. 
H-11 Give me counsel and guidance when needed 
1 . Highly inaccurate 238 respondents 8% 
2 .  208 fl 7/o 
Intensity J. 327 " 11% 
Index 4 .  Somewhat accurate 744 I I  25% 
4. 57 5 .  506 " 17% 
6 . 566 " 19% 
7. Highly accurate 417 " 14r}b 
The majority felt that Senior Officers gave them guidance and 
counseling when it was needed, thus - constituting a positive 
communication response . 
H-12 Pass the buck 
7. Highly inaccurate 536 respondents 1� 
6. 447 t i  15% 
Intensity 5. 445 " 15% 
Index 4. Somewhat accurate 595 ti  20% 
4. 36 3. 357 II  12% 
2. 298 " 10% 
1. Highly accurate 268 " 9% 
"Pass the Buck" represents negative communication practice. 
Therefore the rating of 1 is the more desirable and the scale was 
inverted before the intensity index was computed. 
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The majority of the respondents felt that their Senior Officers 
did communicate their orders clearly. A moderately positive 
communication response was indicated. 




1. Highly inaccurate 
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The majority felt that their superiors did show concern for those 
under their supervision . Again a moderately positive communication 
response was indicated. 
H-15 Over supervise 
7 .  Highly inaccurate 357 respondents 12% 
6 .  387 t i  13% 
Intensity 5 . 566 t i  19% 
Index 4. Somewhat accurate 566 " 19% 
4 . 08 3 . 387 t i  13% 
2 .  357 t i  12% 
1 .  Highly accurate 357 I I  12% 
"Over supervise" represents a mean neutral communication response 
as indicated by the intensity index. 
H-16 Consider "inexperience" in their evaluation of 
Junior Officers 
1 .  Highly inaccurate 129 respondents 5% 
2. 179 6% 
Intensity 3. 268 g'/o 
Index 4 .  Somewhat accurate 834 28;& 
4 . 57 5 .  595 20% 
6 .  595 20% 
7. Highly accurate 327 11% 
The majority felt that their Senior Officers did consider their 
inexperience when rating them. The intensity index indicates a 
mild positive communication response. 
H-17 Understand the problems of Junior Officers 
1 .  Highly inaccurate 149 respondents 5% 
2. 179 " 6% 
Intensity J . 298 I I  10% 
Index 4 .  Somewhat accurate 834 " 2 8}& 
4.52 5. 625 II 21% 
6. 595 " 20% 
7. Highly accurate 268 " Wo 
The majority of individual respondents felt that their Senior 
Officers did understand their problems , which, combined with the 
intensity index, leads to a positive communication response. 
H-18 Are objective in their Efficiency Ratings 
1. Highly inaccurate 179 respondents 6% 
2 .  179 I I  6% 
Intensity J .  238 " 
Index 4. Somewhat accurate 804 " 27% 
4. 6J 5 .  625 " 21,% 
6 . 655 " 22% 
7 .  Highly accurate 298 " 1� 
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The majority of individual responses felt that their Senior 
Officers were objective in their efficiency ratings. The intensity 
index reveals a moderately positive communication r esponse. 
H-19 Assume responsibility for their mistakes 
1. Highly inaccurate 208 respondents 7/o 
2 .  208 " ?7/o 
Intensity J . 357 " 12% 
Index 4 .  Somewhat accurate 655 , , 2c'fo 
4 . 54 5. 536 " 18}0 
6 .  625 I I  2 1.,% 
7. Highly accurate 417 " 14% 
The majority of respondents felt that their Senior Officers did 
assume responsibility for their mistakes. Again the communication 
response is positive in terms of the intensity index. 
H-20 Do you believe that Senior Officers utilized the 
Efficiency Reporting System in such a manner as 
to assume that most qualified J unior Officers 
are selected for promotion? 
1 .  Yes 
2. No 








The majority of respondents did not feel their Senior Officers 
utilized the Efficiency Reporting System in a way that would assure 
the most qualified were selected for promotion. This constitutes 
one of the small number of negative communication responses. 
H-21 What effect do your relationships with Senior 
Officers have on your Army career decision? 
1. Strong influence to stay 208 respondents 
2. 387 " 
Intensity J .  536 " 
Index 4. No influence 774 I I  
4. 01 5 .  447 " 
6. 268 I I  








The majority of respondents felt that their relationships with 
Senior Officers had no influence on Army career decision. However, 
the percentage of individuals who responded to " strong influence to 
leave" was higher than the percentage of individuals who responded 
to "strong influence to stay. " Viewed with the intensity index, a 
neutral communication effect is found among respondents. 
In the next series of questions the Junior Officer was 
asked to evaluate his fellow Junior Officer. 
I- 1 Intelligence 
Intensity 
Index 
5 . 18 
7. Exhibit to a High Degree 
(EHD) 
6 .  
5 .  
lJ.. Exhibit to a Moderate 
Degree (EMD) 
J . 
2 .  

















The majority of individuals felt that their fellow Junior Officers 
exhibited a moderate or strong degree of intelligence. A relatively 
high positive communication response was found. 
I- 2 Competence 
? .  EHD 179 respondents 6% 
6. 8J4 I I  28}b 
Intensity 5. 1101  " 37/4 
Index 4. EMD 655 " 22% 
5 . 02 J. 149 " 5% 
2. 60 " 2% 
1. mm 0 f l  0% 
The majority of individuals felt that their fellow Junior Officers 
did exhibit to a moderate degree, competence in their work. The 
results were positive. 
I- J Moral character 
7. EHD 298 respondents lCr'/4 
6. 744 2 5%  
Intensity 5 .  8J4 2 8}b  
Index 4. E11D 744 25% 
4.92 J. 268 9% 
2 .  89 3% 
1 .  DNE 30 1% 
The majority of respondents felt that their fellow Junior Officers 
were of moral character and exhibited this to a moderate degree, 
thus a moderately lX)sitive communication response. 
I - 5 .Ma turity 
7 . EHD 179 respondents 6% 
6 . 625 " 2 1% 
Intensity 5 .  893 " JO% 
Index 4. EMD 744 II  25% 
4. 68 J. 357 I I  12% 
2. 119 " 4% 
1 .  DNE JO " 1% 
The majority of individuals credited their fellow Junior Officers 
with moderate degree of maturity exhibited during the performance 
of their duties. This can be considered a somewhat positive 
communication response. 
I- 6 Thoroughness 
,.., EHD 89 respondents ']fa I • 
6. 476 " 16% 
Intensity 5 .  92J " 31% 
Index 4. EHD 92J " 31% 
4. 48 J. 447 " 15% 
2. 89 " 3% 
1. DNE JO I t  1% 
The majority felt that their fellow officers displayed a moderate 
amount of thoroughness when completing a task. A mild positive 
communication response was found. 
I - 7 Sensitivity to others 
7. EHD 119 respondents 4% 
6. 447 " 15% 
Intensity 5 .  8J4 t i  28% 
Index 4. EMD 1012 t i  34% 
4. 47 J .  387 " 13% 
2. 119 " 4% 
1 DNE JO " l1o 
Thirty-four percent of the respondents felt that their fellow 
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officers exhibited a moderate amount of sensitivity to others when 
dealing with personnel. The intensity index reveals a mildly positive 
communication response. 
I - 8  Respect for fellow officers 
7 . EHD 298 respondents 10% 
6. 804 It 2 7}b 
Intensity 5 .  8J4 .. 2 8fo  
Index 4 .  EMD 685 " 23% 
4. 97 J . 208 " 7/o 
2. 
1 . DNE 
89 respondents 
JO " 
The majority of respondents felt that their fellow officers dis­
played this trait to a moderate degree which combined with the 
intensity index constitutes a positive communication response . 
I -10 Leadership 
7. EHD 119 respondents 4% 
6 .  714 " 24% 
Intensity 5 .  1104 " 37% 
Index 4. EMD 744 " 2.5% 
4. 83 J . 208 " 7fo 
2. 60 " 2% 
1 .  DNE JO " ]% 
5J 
Responses to this item constitute a moderately positive communication 
response. 
I-11 Integrity 
7. EHD J27 respond en ts 11% 
6 .  8J4 " 28% 
Intensity 5 . 863 " 2g/o 
Index 4. EMD 6 85 " 2).% 
5 . 05 J . 179 t i  6% 
2 .  60 " 2% 
1 .  DNE JO " 1% 
Responses reveal the majority felt that their fellow officers 
displayed integrity to a moderate or greater degree . A positive 
communication response is revealed by the intensity index. 
I-lJ Skill in communicating verbally and in writ;i.ng 
7 .  EHD 149 respondents 
6 .  566 ti 19% 
Intensity 5 .  893 " . JO% 
Index 4. EMD 8J4 " 28% 
4. 55 J . 357 . . 12% 
2. 149 " 5% 
1 .  DNE 60 " 2% 
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In order to lead others an individual must be able to communicate, 
verbally and/or in writing. The majority felt that their fellow 
Junior Officers exhibited this ability. A moderately positive 
communication response is supported by this intensity index. 
I-14 Military bearing 
7. EHD 179 respondents 6% 
6 . 744 I I  25% 
Intensity 5. 953 II 32% 
Index 4. EMD 714 I I  24% 
4. 83 3. 298 II 10% 
2. 60 " 
1 .  DNE 30 I t  1% 
The majority felt that their fellow Junior Officers displayed a 
moderate degree of military bearing, and an intensity index of 
4.8J constitutes a qualified positive communication response. 
I-15 Self Confidence 
7 .  EHD 208 respondents 
6. 953 " 32% 
Intensity 5. 10 12 " 34% 
Index 4. EMD 625 II 21% 
5.12 3. 149 " 5% 
2. JO ti 
1 . DNE 0 t i  0,_h 
The majority felt that their fellow officers displayed a moderate 
degree of self confidence , which, combined with an intensity index 
of 5. 12, constitutes a positive communication response. 
The next series of responses deals with how the individual 
Junior Officer perceived himself. 
J-16 Ability to Communicate 
1 .  DNE 
2 .  
J .  
0 respondents 
0 
t i  
60 " 
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Intensity 4. EMD J27 respondents 11% 
Index 5 .  804 " 27/4 
5.65 6. 1161 " 39% 
7 . EHD 595 " 20% 
The majority of responding individuals felt that they exhibited to 
a moderately high degree the ability to communicate. The 5 . 65 
intensity index constitutes a positive intra-personal communication 
response . 
J-17 Ability to make decisions 
1 . DNE 0 respondents CY/a 
2 .  0 " CY/a 
Intensity J .  JO " 
Index 4 . EMD 208 " 
5 . 88 5 . 655 " 22% 
6 . 1280 I I  4}% 
7. EHD 804 " 2';% 
The majority felt that they exhibited to a moderately high degree 
the ability to make decisions . This and the intensity index of 
5. 88 constitutes a positive intra-personal communication response. 
J-18 Sensitivity to others 
1 . DNE JO respondents 1% 
2 .  JO " 
Intensity J. 89 " 
Index 4. EMD J87 " l}Jb 
5 . 61 5 .  625 " 21% 
6. 1042 " 35% 
7. EHD 774 I I  26% 
The majority felt that they displayed a moderate to high degree of 
sensitivity to others. Again the higher intensity index indicates 
a positive inter-personal communication response. 
J-19 Ability to accept and follow orders 
1 .  DNE 





Intensity J. 60 respondents 
Index 4. EMD 2J8 I I  � 
5. 89 5 .  506 " 17% 
6. 1161 I I  J9% 
7. EHD 953 I I  J2% 
The majority of individuals felt that they displayed a moderately 
high degree of ability to accept and follow orders. The intensity 
index supports this conclusion and a positive communication 
respmse. 
D-22 Officer Efficiency Reports 
7 . Strong influence to stay 89 respondents 
6. 149 " 
Intensity 5 .  2 08 " 
Index 4. No influence 1578 I I  5'Y/o 
J.6J 3. 357 I I  12% 
2. 268 II  
1 . Strong influence to leave 327 " 11% 
The Officer Efficiency Report is considered a written form of 
communication between a Senior Officer and a Junior Officer. As 
answered by the majority of individuals, this communication document 
did not in�luence their decision to leave or stay on active duty, 
but the above mean intensity index reveals a negative communication 
response. 
M- 1 How many formal or informal career0 counseling 
interviews have you had with your Senior Officer? 
1 .  One 506 respondents 17% 
2. Two J87 , , lJlo 
3 . Three 208 I I  
4 .  Four or more 476 " 16% 
5 . None 1369 " 46% 
This question and response shows a definite lack of communication 
between Junior and Senior Officers, with a plurality stating that 
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they did not receive any formal or informal care er-counseling 
interviews. This constitutes a negative communication response 
between Junior and Senior Officers. 
M- 2 What was the attitude of your career counselor 
towards you and your career? (Enter " 0" if you 
have not been counsel ed. )  
1 .  Not interested JO respondents 
2. JO " 
1% 
Intensity J .  89 " 
I ndex 4 .  Moderately interested 298 " 10% 
5 . 35 5 . 298 " 10% 
6 .  J87 " 13% 
7 . V ery interested 417 " 14% 
Of those individuals who did have career-counseling interviews , 
the majority felt that their counselors were inter ested in the 
individual. The high intensity index indicates a positive inter ­
personal communication response . 
M- J What effect have these career-counseling sessions 
had on your Army career decision ? 
7 . Strong influence to stay 119 respondents 
6 .  179 




I ndex 4 .  No. influence 1369 46% 
4 . 21  J.  119 
2 .  60 
1 .  Strong influence to leave 89 
In r elation to M-2 the communication relationship established 
between the counselor and the Junior Off icer had only a mild 
positive influence or none on the career decision of the Junior 
Officer . This constitutes a n eutral to positive inter -personal 
communication r esponse. 
4% 
'J'/o 
The total number of questions in the Franklin Study was 
424 (less questions with fewer/more than seven responses and less 
communication questions) with a mean average intensity index of 
J . 94 as indicated on the graph. The mean average response to 











the moderate influence toward the strong influence , indicating that 
the communication series of questions played a greater part in 
influencing the Junior Officers relationship with his Senior 
Officer than did the composite of remaining items. However, the 
relationship that communications played in the Franklin Study had 
little or no effect on the Junior Officers' Career decisions. If 
anything could be assumed, communication between J unior and Senior 
Officers was not a negative factor in causing the Junior Officer 
to separate but was a positive factor causing the Junior Officer 
to remain on active duty. 
At the time the Franklin Study was completed, Army 
retention of Junior Officers was high, 24. 2%, indicating that the 
problems surfacing from Vietnam, as outlined in Chapter II, may not 
have influenced the Junior Officer to any great extent as of 1968 , 
when the study was completed. 
The West Poin t Study 
The second part of this chapter deals with the questions 
and answers of the West Poi nt Study, completed on 6 July 1970 . 
In  June 1970 , the U.S . Army became extremely concerned 
because a hifsh percentage rate ( 23 . 1%)  of the United States 
Military Academy Class of 1966 who were commissioned in the Army 
had tendered their resignations from active duty. The average 
resignation rate of the past 12 classes had been 15.5%, a 7 . 6% 
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increase. The West Point Study addressed i tself to the 
resignation problem by seeking the answers to three questions:  
A .  Why did members of the USMA Class of 1966 resign? 
B. How does the quality of the resignees compare 
with that of the stay ins? 
C .  What can be done to reduce resignations from the 
USMA classes? 
This s tudy includes one phase of the West Point Study-­
the communication relationship between the Jun ior Officer 
resignees and their Senior Officers . There were 81 individuals 
who responded to the questionnaire. 
All questions and answers in the West Point Study were 
based on an attitudinal scale. The intensity index was based on 
the scale from one ( 1) to six ( 6 )  which the respondents used on 
the surveys. Checking one ( 1 ) meant the reason had no influence 
and was not applicable to the individual. A six ( 6 )  meant the 
reason was decisive. If all 81 respondents had checked the "6" 
column, the over-all intensity index would appear as six. If , 
however, 40 had checked six ( 6 )  and 41 the one ( 1 ) the intensity 
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index would be the sum of 40 x 6 and 41 x 1, with the total 
divided ·by 81 or J.46. 
The West Point Study consisted of 70 questions dealing 
with those aspects of military life which dir ectly affected the 
J unior Officer. The questions d ealing with communication ar e 
listed by question number and the intensity index . 
Question 25 :  Lack of  authority commensurate with your 
responsibilities. 
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The category of decisive ( 6 )  was selected by 4J% of the individuals. 
The total r esponse intensity index was J.15. 
Question 27 :  Your suggestions not listened to. 
The category of decisive ( 6 )  was selected by J2.4J% of the 
individuals. The total r esponse intensity index was 2.74. 
Question 2 8: Lack of oppor tunity for independent action 
and initiative. 
The category of decisive ( 6 )  was selected by 53.53% of the 
individuals. The total r esponse intensity index was 3. 56. 
�uestion 2 9 :  Officer efficiency r epor ts . 
The category of decisive ( 6 )  was selected by 45/o of the individuals. 
The total r esponse intensity index was J . 15. 
Question 4J : Your leaders wer e  not inspiring. 
The category of decisive ( 6 )  was selected by 51 . 2 5% of the 
individuals . The toal r esponse intensity index was J . 47 . 
Question 44: Lack of integrity of super iors. 
The category of decisive · ( 6 ) was selected by 51% of the individuals. 
The total r esponse intensity index was J . 46 . 
Question 45 : Superiors o ver supervised. 
The category of  decisive ( 6 )  was selected by 50. 74% of  the 
i ndividuals . The total response intensity index was J . 45 . 
Question 46 : Superiors did not understand yo ur problem . 
The category of decisive ( 6 )  was selected by 24 . 17% of  the 
individuals. The total response intensity index was 2 . 42 . 
Question 47 : Superiors did not assume responsibility 
for their mistakes . 
The category of decisiv e ( 6) was sele-cted by 14 . 97fe of the 
individuals . The total response intensity index was J . 11 . 
Question 48: Superiors were no t competent. 
The category of  decisive ( 6 )  was selected by 47 . 9% of  the 
individuals . The total response intensity index was J . J4 .  
Question 49 : Superiors were not dedicated . 
The category  of de cisive (6 )  was selected by 16. 69% of the 
individuals. The total response intensity was 2 . lJ . 
Question 50 : Superiors were not courageous. 
The category of  decisive (6)  was se lected by 24 . 42% o f  the 
individuals . The total response intensity index was 2 . 43 .  
Question 51 :  Lack of accessibility of Senior Officer 
for advice and co unseling . 
The category of decisi ve ( 6 )  was sele cted by 11. 7% of  the 
individuals . The total response intensity index was 1 . 94 .  
Question 52 : Criticized inappro priately o r  for invalid 
reasons. 
The category of decisiv e ( 6 )  was s�lected by 2 1 . 85% of the 
indi viduals. The total response intensity index was 2. JJ. 
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In analyzing the decisive reasons why individuals left 
active service, those questions which dealt with communication were 
further examined as to the percentage of respondents who answered 
each question in relation to the intensity index selected. 
The following order of most decisive to least decisive 
questions is listed by question number and the percentage of 
responses to each question. 
Question 28: Lack of opportunity for independent 
Question 43 :  
Question 44: 
Question 45 : 
Question 48:  
Question 29 : 
Question 25 : 
Question 47: 
Question 27: 
Question 50 : 
Question 46 :  
Question 52 :  
action and initiative 
Your leaders were not inspiring 
Lack of integrity of superiors 
Superiors over supervised 
Superiors were not competent 
Officer efficiency reports 
Lack of authority commensurate 
with your responsibilities 
Superiors did not assume respon­
sibility for their mistakes 
Your suggestions not listened to 
Superiors were not courageous 
Superiors did not understand your 
problem 
Criticized inappropriately or for 
invalid reasons 
Question 49 : Superiors were not dedicated 
Question 51: Lack of accessibility of Senior 
Officers for advice and counseling 
53.6% 
53.6% 
51 � 0% 






24 . 1,% 
21.  gfo 
16 . 7/o 
11 . 8;0 
6J 
The West Point Study with 70 questions had a mean remaining 
question average intensity index of 2. 54 as indicated on the graph. 
The mean average communication question intensity index of 2 . 91 as 










form appears to have had a greater influence on the West Pointer 
in his Army Career decision than did the composite non-communication 
factors covered in the West Point Study. 
Further analysis shows the majority of respondents had 
accessibility to their Senior Officers . However, a majority felt 
their Senior Officers were not inspiring, lacked integrity, and over 
supervised them. 
The Ordnance Study 
In the present analysis of the Ordnance Study, which consisted 
of 116 questions, only those questions which dealt primarily with 
the communication relationship between the Junior and Senior 
Officers were selected. A total of twenty-eight (28) questions 
was identified as dealing with communication factors. 
The analysis of the Ordnance Study differs somewhat from 
the Franklin Study and the West Point Study in that intensity 
indexes could not be computed, due to the study format which does 
not allow for a v �lid numerical difference between answer 
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discriminations . The study , however , allows question analysis by 
the use of percentages , An answer discrimination was selected 
for each question, based on the total nwnber of responses . Each 
question will be discussed in detail in chronological order as it 
appears in the questionnaire . 
Question J. With which one of the following aspects of 
military life were you most dissatisfied? 
a. Separation from family BJ respondents 
b. Pay 16 " 
c. Frequent PCS (permanent change of 
station) moves 27 " 
d. Leadership of superiors 107 " 
e. Housing 11 " 
Within the scope of this question and the various 
discriminations which the respondent could select a clear plurality 
were dissatisfied with leadership of their supervisors . It must 
be understood that the question makes no demand on the respondent 
to reach a decision--that is to say, which were you most dis­
satisfied with, not which caused you to leave the service ? 
Question 9 .  Were your commanders receptive to your 
recommendations and suggestions? 
a. All of my commanders were receptive 
to my recommendations and suggestions 
b ,  Most of my commanders were receptive 
to my recommendations and suggestions 
JS respond en ts 
c. Few of my commanders were receptive 
to my recommendations and suggestions 
d. None of my commanders were receptive 







The response in this question indicates that there was 
relatively effective communication between Junior and Senior 
Officers as to the Officers' receptiveness to Junior Officers' 
recommendations and suggestions. 
Question 10. Did you consider your superior officers well 
qualified for their job? 
a. All of them 
b. Most of them 
c .  Few of them 





The majority of respondents felt that most of their Senior 
Officers were well qualified for their jobs. However , a sizable 
number of respondents indicated that their Senior Officers were 
less than qualified for their jobs. 
Question 11. Do you feel that your commanders were 
sincerely interested in your remaining in the Army and choosing the 
Army as a career? 
a. All of them 40 responses 16 . 'J}'o  
b. Host of them 88 responses 31.6�; 
c. Few of them 106 responses 4J. 4% 
d. None of them 10 responses 4. 1% 
Of the Junior Officers responding, 4J . 4% held that few of 
their Commanders (Senior Officers) were sincerely interested in 
the Junior Officers' remaining in and choosing the Army as a career . 
These responses certainly do not indicate any strong positive 
Senior Officer influence on an affirmative decision. 
Question 12. Did any of your superior officers counsel 
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This question is related directly to question 11. Basic 
U. S. Army policy recommends that all Senior Officers counsel Junior 
Officers about remaining in the service and about making the Army 
a career. This is shown by the 72% of the respondents answering 
yes to question 12. The relationship of question 11 and question 
12 shows that even though 176 of the responden ts stated that they 
were counseled by their superiors, 106 respondents in question 11 
stated that few were interested in their remaining in or choosing the 
Army as a career. Apparently the intended message was not 
communicated positively to the Junior Officer. 
Question lJ. Do you feel that your personal desires 
concerning assignments, branch and other considerations were taken 
into account by the Army? 
a. Yes 153 responses 63 . 0% 
b. No, but I received a satis-
factory explanation as to why 
they were not. 31 responses 11 . 5% 
c. No, and I did not receive a 
satisfactory explanation as to 
why they were not. 60 responses 24 . 6% 
An explanation of Army policy must be given here before one 
can fully understand the question and its answers . Department of 
the Army made and still makes it well known that personal desires 
concerning assignments, branch and other considerations will be 
taken into full account once the need of the Army has been filled.10 
This can be best illustrated by showing the relationship between 
an individual and DA (Department of the Army). 
An individual wishes to be assigned to Germany; the Army 
has X number of spaces available at the time in Germany and X + Y 
individuals requesting Germany. With more personnel requesting 
Germany than there are spaces, some desires are not met; however, 
they were taken into account. 
The majority of respondents ( 153) felt their desires were 
taken into account. The next Jl respondents felt their desires 
were not taken into account ( i. e. ,  the example stated above) , and 
finally, �. 60 respondents felt their desires were not taken 
into account nor did they receive satisfactory answers as to why 
they were not considered. 
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A breakdown in communication affected at least 60 
respondents . Communication breakdowns do occur in both directions, 
up and down. This failure may have been in either direction. 
Question 14. To what extent were your education, training 
and experience (both civilian and military) utilized in your duty 
assignments? 
a .  Well utilized 
b. Utilized 







The majority of respondents felt that their education and 
training were being utilized, but not to the fullest extent possible, 
as seen in c. Not having one ' s education and training fully 
utilized can hav8 detrimental effects on the individual, causing 
discontent and . dissatisfaction on the job and a breakdown in the 
upward and downward flow of communication. 
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Question 16 . Did you receive an orientation or counseling 
period on how to apply for a Regular Army Commission, indefinite 
category or short term extension, prior to your release from 
Active Duty? 
a. Yes, and it did influence me to 
remain on active duty beyond 
my obligation • 
b. Yes, but it did not influence 
my plans to leave active duty. 
c .  No, and it might have influenced 
me to remain longer on active 
duty. 
d .  No, but it would not have 
influenced my plans to leave 
active duty. 
e. I do not remember . 
66 responses 27% 
58 responses 24% 
22 responses g/o 
93 responses 3� 
responses 2% 
To understand the communication relationship between those 
officers who received an orientation or counseling period and those 
who did not receive an orientation or counseling period, and their 
decisions to remain on active duty or get out, a comparison between 
.§: and E ,  £ and _q_, .§: and £, and E and .9. must be undertaken. a 
represents 27% of the total 244, E represents 2��, £ represents gfo, 
i represents 35% and � represents 2%, which is of little value to the 
overall data revealed by the question. 
In comparing � and E•  both answers show that there was a 
two-way communication between J unior Officers and those higher up. 
Comparing £ and .9., shows there was no communication in both 
directions, upward and downward. However, had there been communi­
cation in £ ,  more individuals may have been influenced to stay. 
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In comparing � and E,  one sees that in one case communi­
cation was effective in keeping Junior Officers , and in the other 
case, had there been communication between higher and lower ranks, 
more individuals might have stayed on active duty . 
Answers to E and £, indicate that regardless of communication 
or the lack of it , there was no intent on the part of the 
individuals to remain on active duty. 
Question 18. Did the Ordnance Corp satisfactorily manage 
your career? 
a . Yes 
b .  No 




Responses show that a plurality of individuals ( not the 
total asked) who an swered the question were satisfied with the 
two-way communication between themselves and those who managed 
their careers. 
Question 26 . Leadership of superiors . 
a .  Strong influence to stay 9 responses 3 . 7% 
b .  Moderate influence to stay 39 responses 15 . 9% 
c .  No influence 49 responses 20. 1% 
d .  Moderate influence to leave 76 respon ses 31 . 2% 
e .  Strong influence to leave 71 respon ses 29 . 1% 
The number of individuals dissati sfied with their Senior 
Officers ' ability to lead their subordinates is clearly shown by 
the responses to £ and � vs . the responses to _§: and b in the above 
question . 
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Question 28 . Efficiency Reports . 
a. Strong influence to stay 
b. Moderate influence to stay 
c .  No influence 
d .  Moderate influence to leave 
22 responses 
32 responses 13 . 2°/4 
102 responses 41 . 8fo 
responses l&/o 
e .  Strong influence to leave 44 responses 18% 
Effictency reports are written by Superior or Senior 
Officers. During the time frame of this study there was no 
re:i_uirement of the Senior Officers to show the completed report to 
the individual he rated . Therefore, it is felt that this may have 
been the cause of the high frequency of " no influence, " as those 
officers did not know what their Senior Officers wrote about them . 
Question 58 .  Provide Junior Officers with more opportunity 
for command experience. 
a .  I would definitely make 
the Army a career. 13 responses 5 . 4% 
b. I would possibly make the 
Army a career. 71 responses 29 . J.% 
c. This would have no influence 
on my career decision. 147 responses 60 . 2% 
d. I would possibly leave active 
duty . 9 responses J . 7%  
e. I would definitely leave 
active duty. } responses l . cfo 
This communication relationship question affected the 
individual's decision· to remain on active duty vs . leaving active 
duty. Although the majority of individuals who responded to the 
question stated it had no influence on their career decision, the 
84 who responded positively that had there been more communication 
with their Senior Officers, more would have remained on active 
duty. 
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Question 80. I hoped to receive responsibility and 
challenges; to lead others. 
a. Strong influence 
b. Moderate influence 




This question deals with "Why the Individual Chose a 
Commission in the Army. " Sixty-eight percent indicated that, hoping 
to receive responsibility and challenge; to lead others , was an 
extremely strong influence to choose a Commission in the Army. 
The majority of individuals felt that they could communicate with 
those higher and lower and be able to be leaders of others. 
The next six questions dealt with the individual respondents' 
describing their Senior Officers. 
Question 88 . Give constructive criticism. 
a. This is a highly accurate description 
of my Senior Officer. JS  responses 
b. This is a somewhat accurate description 
of my Senior Officer . 144 responses 
c. This is a highly inaccurate description 
of my Senior Officer. 56 responses 
The majority of individuals felt that their Senior Officers 
did give them constructive criticism when it was given. What is 
not known is how many times each individual received constructive 
criticism from his superiors. 
Quest ion 89. Critique me in front of others . 
a. This is a highly accurate description 
of flY Senior Officer . 
b .  This is a somewhat accurate description 
of my Senior Officer .  
c. This is a highly inaccurate description 





This question does show a relatively high degree of positive 
communication between Junior and Senior Officers. However, A and 
B show that 37fo of the Junior Officers may have been critiqued 
by their Senior Officers in front of others , which is a fairly 
high degree of negative communication. 
Quest1on 90 . Commend me for good work. 
a . This is a highly accurate description 
of my Senior Officer. 
b. This is a somewhat accurate description 
of my Senior Officer. 
c .  This is a highly inaccurate description 




This question does show a high percentage of individuals 
felt that they received little commendatory communication 
concerning their effective efforts. 
Question 92 . Give me counsel and guidance. 
a. This is a highly accurate description 
of my Senior Officer. 37 responses 
b. This is a somewhat accurate description 
of my Senior Officer. 137 responses 
c .  This is a highly inaccurate description 
of - my Senior Officer. 70 responses 
In dealing with Junior Officers, many Senior Officers were 
perceived as failing in their efforts to give guidance and counsel 
to the Junior Officer. 
Question 93 . Consider '' ine .. · perience0 in their evaluation 
of Junior Officers. 
a . Thj s is a highly accurate description 
of my Senior Officer . 
b .  This is a somewhat accurate description 




c. This is a highly inaccurate description 
of my Senior Officer. 
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56 responses 
Question 94. Are objective in their Efficiency Ratings 
a. This is a highly accurate description 
of my Senior Officer. 49 responses 
b. This is a somewhat accurate description 
of my Senior Officer. 124 responses 
c. This is a highly inaccurate description 
of my Senior Officer. 71 responses 
The prime method of evaluating an officer ' s  worth in the 
Army is with Efficiency Reports done by the rated officers Senior. 
Inexperience and objectivity are both considered indicators within 
the efficiency evaluation system. Therefore, Questions 93 and 94 
must be analyzed together because of their relationship to each 
other within the efficiency evaluation system. Inexperience on the 
part of Junior Officers is something Senior Officers were per ceived 
as failing to understand, many Junior Officers may have never been 
placed in positions of responsibility before and they had to 
respond correctly or face the inevitable bad efficiency rating. 
Objectivity on the part of Senior Officers is something 
Senior Officers were perceived as lacking when considering an 
efficiency evaluation of the Junior Officer ' s  job performance. 
Senior 
Question 97. What effect did your relationship with 
Officers have on your Army career decision? 
a. Strong influence to leave 6 8  responses 27.9% 
b. Moderate influence to leave 68 responses 27 . gfo 
c. No influence 51 responses 20.9% 
55 . 8fo 
d .  Moderate influence to stay 32 responses lJ.1% 2J. J% e. Strong influence to stay 25 responses 10.2% 
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With 55.Bfo of the respondents answering that their 
relationship with their Senior Officers had a moderate to strong 
influence on their leaving active duty, a communication gap between 
Seniors and Juniors appears to have been shown. 
The next four questions deal with the individual and how 
he or she perceived him/herself . 
Question 98. Leadership 
a. Exhibit to high degree 99 responses 
b .  Exhibit to moderate degree 1J9 responses 
c. Do not exhibit 6 responses 
Question 108. Ability to communicate. 
a .  Exhibit to high degree 
b. Exhibit to moderate degree 
c. Do not exhibit 
Question 109. Ability to make 
a. Exhibit to high degree 
b. Exhibit to moderate degree 








Question 110. Ability to accept and follow orders . 
a. Exhibit to high degree 
b. Exhibit to moderate degree 




40 . 6% 
56. gfv 
2 . 5% 
49.2% 
47.1% 




In analyzing all four of the above questions the majority 
of the respondents felt that they displayed a moderate to strong 
ability to communicate with each other, with the men they lead 
and with their superiors, such self-evaluation must be considered 
highly inconclusive. 
Question llJ .  How many formal or  informal career­
counseling interviews did you have with your Senior Officers?  
a .  1 
b. 2 
c .  J 





27 . 4%  
17 . 5% 
10 . 5% 
19 . J% 
A plurality of Junior Officers responding received only 
o ne formal or informal career -coun seling interview during their 
stay on active duty. 
Ques tion 114. What was the attitude of  yo ur career 
counselor towards you and your career? 
a .  Very interested 
b .  Moderately interested 
c .  No t interested 
d .  Was no t counseled 




27 . 5fo 
35 . 2% 
16 . 8%  
20 . 5% 
The majority of individuals who were counseled were 
moderately happy with the interest their career counselors too k 
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in them . It  must be understood that an individual ' s career 
counselor for the mo st part was not the individual ' s  Senior Officer, 
but an individual who dealt with career coun seling as his primary 
job . 
Questio n 115 . What effect did these career-counseling 
sessions have o n  your Army Career decision? 
a .  Strong influence to stay 11 responses 4 . 5% 
b .  Moderate influence to stay 53 respo nses 21 . 7%  
c .  No influence 14J responses 58 . 6% 
d .  Moderate influence to leave 16 respo nses 6 . 6% 
e .  Strong influence to leave 21 responses 8 . 6% 
Here the majority of individual respondents stated that 
the career counseling sessions had no influence on their 
decisions , though more than one-fourth did perceive a positive 
effect from the commun ication. 
Analysis of  the study tends to indicate that those 
Ordnance Junior Officers uho chose to separate from active duty 
were very much concerned with " leadership of  superiors" as an 
aspect o f  mili tary life with which they were most dissatisfied . 
This coupled with other relationship perceptions by the Junior 
Officer may have been instrumental in creating an atmosphere of 
dissatisfaction which over a period of  time led to a career decision 
to separate . 
SUMMAR Y 
The communication questions included in each study were 
presented in parts 1 ,  2 ,  and J . Each study was conducted by a 
different organ ization and at different times. 
The Franklin Study was completed in September, 1968, which 
makes it the oldest study used in the research . Many o f  the 
Army ' s  problems with Junior Officers began after 1968 and con tinued 
on through 1972. As indicated by the mean intensity index, the poor 
commun ication was not likely to have been a strong decisive influence 
on the J unior Officer and his Army career decision to separate when 
compared with the composite mean intensity index o f  the non ­
communication questions. 
The West Point Study was completed in July 1970 and dealt 
with proble�s encoun tered by West Point Graduates of the Class 
of 1966 during the Army's personnel turmoil from 1968. The mean 
intensity index differences between the total non-communication 
questions and the communication questions shows that the 
communication factors might have had more decisive effect on the 
Junior Officer to separate. 
The Ordnance Study was completed in May 1971 and dealt 
with Junior Officer retention in the Ordnance Corp. The study 
consisted of 116 questions dealing with aspects of the Junior 
Officer's attitudes toward the military and his/her Senior 
Officers .  
A clear cut analysis of the Ordnance Study was not 
accomplished due to the format of the study. The study itself 
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was not set up using numerical answer discriminations or an 
attitudinal scale for the respondents to select. However, responses 
to questions �ere analyzed as separate units . Analysis of the 
responses indicate seven general factors which may have indluenced 
the 244 respondents to leave military service . These are ranked, 
in order of purported influence , in Table V, page 78 . 
Any attempt to draw statistical conclusions from extensive 
comparison of all three studies combined would be impractical due 
to the variety of questions and formats utili zed in all studies . 
However, there is little reason to conclude that the studies 
--
TABLE V 
INFLUENCING FACTORS TO LEAVE THE ARNY* 
Tour in Vietnam 
Family Separation 
Civilian Opportunities 
Sr . Off .  Leadership 
Frequent Moves 



















I 70 . 4% 
I 68.0% 
64.7% 
61 . 4% 
53.6% 
45 . 4% 
40 . 9fo  
100% 
% of Responding Officers ( 244) 
*Ordnan ce Corps Officers Lo ses 
This table was derived from the complete Ordnance Corps 
Study . Each influencing factor was made up from a question group 
in the study dealing with the specific influence . The complete 
list of factor s  consisted of nineteen major significant areas of 
influence . The seven shown in the chart are the major influencing 
factors causing the J unior Officer to separate from active duty . 
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indicate communication problems between Junior and Senior Officers 
were of any overriding influence in the Junior Officers' decisions 
to separate. 
FOOTNOTES 
1The review of Official Officer Personnel Files was con­
ducted by a team of officers from the United States Military 
Academy and the U.S. Army Ordnance Center and �chool of which the 
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2 U. S. Department of the Army, Headquarters, Department of 
the Army Pamphlet Number 601-4 , Commander ' s  Guide to the Retention 
of Junior Officers (Washington , D.C. : G. P. O. , Nov. 1970) , p. ii . 
3 I bid. , p. 1-1. 
4Franklin Institute of Research. Career Motivation of Army 
Personnel-Junior Officers' Duties, Philadelphia, Sept. 1968. 
(Typewritten. ) 
5
u . s .  Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Personnel. Why They Leave : Resignations from the UShA 
Class of 1966, July 1970 , (Typewritten.) 
6 
, 1 U.S. Army Ordnance Center and �choo • 
Officer Losses, May 1971. (Typewritten.) 
Ordnance Corps 
7
u . s. Department of the Army, Why They Leave : Resignations 
from the USMA Class of 1966 . 
8Department of Army Pamphlet 601-4, p. 2-1 . 
9Researchers own personal experience as a Commissioned U. S. 
Army Officer in the U.S. Army from 1966 to 1975. 
CHAPTER IV 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
The purpose of this study has been to determine the 
communication relationship between Senior Army Officers and Junior 
Officers who separated from the service voluntarily from 1966 
through 1970 as revealed in selected U.S . Army Studies. 
A survey of appropriate publications was conducted to find 
any previous studies similar to this research subject. Those 
studies which appeared similar were analyzed further and found 
to be different from this current study. Thus, the uniqueness of 
this s tudy was established . 
Three U. S. Army studies were utilized as the basis of data 
from which an analysis of the communication relationship between 
Junior and Senior U. S .  Army Officers could be made. The studies 
were analyzed in an attempt to determine the degree, nature, and 
directio n of communication between J unio r and Senior Officers as 
a factor in the Junior Officers ' decision to separate fro m  active 
military service between 1966 and 1970. 
A Summary of Events 
The V i etnam War 
In  July 1964 , the United States became involved ,  with the 
Gulf of Tonkin resolution, with the South Vietnamese in their war 
with North Vietnam . As the United States sank deeper and deeper 
into the war , protest activity escalated at home . Discontent at 
home bred discontent within the military. I n  1970 , retention of 
Junior Officers reached its lowest level in more than 10 years , 
causing military leaders great concern. I t  was this concern that 
led to a number of studies on retention . However , the studies on 
retention did not fully address the problem of poor commun i cation 
and a communication breakdown as factors in Junior Officer . .  
retention . 
The retention problem 
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It  was during the final years of the Vietnam War that the 
U . S .  Army began to realize that i t  had a problem with insufficient 
retention of Junior Offi cers . Because of this retention problem 
the U . S .  Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel conducted 
several retention studies, using Army and outside agencies to 
conduct the studies to learn why Junior Officers on active military 
service , who at one time favored an Army career , voluntar i ly 
separated from active duty. The recommendations and findings of 
these studies were to be used to implement new programs to improve 
J unior Officer retention. 
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Summary of the Studies 
The Franklin Study 
The Franklin Study was directed toward identifying the 
relationships among various factors that influenced Junior Officers' 
Army career decisions . Special emphasis of the study was given 
to duty assignments, career management, leadership of superiors, 
duties and career counseling. The group selected for study was 
company grade officers with more than six months but less than 
five years active federal commissioned service. 
The questionnaire was distributed to more than 4500 
individuals by the Franklin Institute Research Laboratories , 2977 
individuals responded to the 424 questions. All questions and 
answers were based on attitudinal scale. 
The Franklin Study results only highlighted communication 
questions and responses. This researcher took communication 
questions from the Franklin Study and analyzed those questions in 
an attempt to determine the effect that poor communication played 
in the Junior Officer ' s  decision to separate. 
The West Point Study 
The West Point Study was undertaken to determine why the 
1966 West Point Class had an abnormally high number of resignations 
from active duty and the factors which influenced the individual's 
career decision, with emphasis being placed on leadership of 
superiors, duty assignments, career management, efficiency reports, 
family separations and career counseling. 
The questionnaire, consisting of 70 objective questions 
based on attitudinal scale, was administered to the 100 resignees 
by mail with eighty-one resignees responding. This research 
extracted the communication questions and did an analysis intended 
to determine the role poor communication played in the graduates' 
decision to leave active duty. 
The Ordnance Study 
The Ordnance Study was directed toward identifying the 
various factors that influenced Ordnance Corps, Junior Officers' 
decisions to separate. During the study, special emphasis was 
given to factors of possible influence, such as duty assignemtns, 
leadership of superiors, family separation, career management, 
and career counseling. 
The survey was directed to the 446 Ordnance Corps Junior 
Officers wm separated from active duty between 1966 and 1970, by 
mail with 244 individuals responding to the questionnaire. The 
questionnaire consisted of 116 questions, either multiple choice 
or attitude scale. Because of the two different types of questions 
utilized, an exact analysis of the extracted communication-type 
questions was not possible . However, each question was evaluated 
based on a percentage of respondents who selected a specific answer 
discriminator. 
Conclusions 
Based on the findings of this study , the following 
conclusions have been drawn: 
1. During the final years of the Vietnamese War the 
United States Army experienced a serious problem in retention of 
Junior Officers. 
2. Three specific studies were undertaken by the United 
States Army which were intended to identify the causes of the high 
level of separations of Junior Officers. 
J . While these studies did not categorize questions as 
dealing with communication, a number of communication-related 
questions were identified in each study. 
4. While communication problems between Junior and Senior 
Officers during the period covered by this study may have been 
influential in the Junior Officers' decisions to separate, the 
findings in this present inquiry do not support a conclusion that 
communication problems were more influential than the composite 
of other factors. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
With what has been learned from this study about communi­
cation and Junior Officer retention, it is recommended that another 
study be undertaken to determine the communication relationships 
between Junior and Senior Officers who are currently serving in 
the active Army, and how the communication relationship has 
affected Junior Officer retention. 
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I t  is further recommended that such a study be desiV') ed 
to allow for a measure of statisti cal significance in the 
findings . Perhaps such a study could utilize  some or all of the 
communication questions identified in this present inquiry . The 
historic milieu provided in this study may also provide a 
foundation for further inquiry i�to the role of communication 
between Junior and Senior Officers in the Junior Officer s '  decisions 
to separate. 
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